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Dealing with non-proliferation in a European perspective requires two preliminary 
qualifications.  
First of all, this paper deals with military nuclear proliferation primarily because the 4
th 
article of the main document of international law treating this issue, the Non-proliferation Treaty of 
1968, guarantees “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” (Art. IV.1) Because the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), has no explicit non-proliferation goal
1, it will not enter in this study. Dating 
back to March 25
th 1957, it aims at establishing a European free zone for nuclear fuel and 
controlling the fuel cycle in the six member states via quickly building and developing nuclear 
industries. The military aspect of the problem only appears with French nuclear tests in Reggane 
(1960). 
Secondly, the paper focuses on nuclear matters even if the European strategy evokes the 
larger category of “weapons of mass destruction”, stating that “proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security.”
2   
 
 
Introduction: from a pacifist mirage to a preference for international norms 
 
Europe, as a guarantor of peace within its borders for fifty years, is sometimes associated 
with a radical aversion towards the use of force. Such an assumption, already debatable regarding 
conventional interventions
3, is deeply confusing when you consider non-proliferation. 
First, the so-called aversion towards the use of force may justify both proliferation and non-
proliferation. For instance, since the beginning of the eighties, Kenneth Waltz has continued to state 
that “more [nuclear states] may be better”
4. In his view, the fear of escalation with mutual 
destruction as a possibility would prevent any kind of conflict. More accurately, the probability of a 
major conflict between nuclear-weapon states is close to zero.
5 This lethal perspective is supposed 
to reduce misperceptions of the adversary’s intentions. Of course, the entire argument stands on the 
idea that the atomic bomb is the only weapon that reaches its target when it is not used. The 
                                                 
1 Bertrand Goldschmidt, “Proliferation and non-proliferation in Europa” in Harald Müller (ed.), A European non-
proliferation policy, prospects and problems, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.9. 
2 http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf p.3. 
3 Bastian Giegerich, William Wallace, “Not such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces”, 
Survival, vol.46 n°2, summer 2004, pp.163-182. 
4 For the more up to date reappraisal of this statement, see Kenneth. N. Waltz, in Kenneth N. Waltz & Scott D. Sagan, The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons, a Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton & Company, 2003, chap.1, 3 et 4.  
5 K. N. Waltz, “The origins of war in neo-realist theory” in R.I. Rotberg, T.K. Rabb (dir.), The Origins and Preventions 
of Major Wars, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.   
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opposite argument, which suggests that non-proliferation is advocated when there is an aversion to 
any use of military force, will not be developed.  
Second, the use of force is not totally excluded from the European Security Strategy. It is 
considered as a means of last resort in the struggle against proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and must be approved by the UN Security Council.
6 
For these two reasons, it is neither relevant to talk about intransigent pacifism
7 nor to invoke 
weakness. That is why this paper questions the notion of a specific European preference, which 
would stand between strict power politics and weak moral pacifism. 
 
Defining the European Preference in 2006: Multilateral Treaty-Based Governance of Non-
proliferation 
 
It is not only a preference for non-proliferation, but a specific way of striving towards this 
goal. It can be described as treaty-based governance, at least partly compatible with state 
sovereignty.  
Governance based on international legislation lies at the core of the European approach: the 
6
th paragraph of the European Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) specifies that “The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [1968; 
1970]
8 must be preserved in its integrity”
9 (chapter I.6). However, the broader notion of governance 
is all the more accurate as many corollary treaties or agreements are concerned: the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT; 1996), the pursuit of negotiations to establish a Fissile Material Cut-Off 
Treaty FMCT (Chapter II.16), and the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).
10 Indeed, the 25 UE-members have all signed and ratified these treaties. As well, 
                                                 
6 I have to admit, following Clara Portela – “The Role of the EU in the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond”, PRIF Report 65 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 
2003, p.27” – that the reference to the UN Security Council is not totally clear in the European Strategy against the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction even if it is clearer than in the previous EU documents. The text is the 
following: “When these measures (including diplomatic dialogue and political pressure), coercive measures under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, 
as appropriate, the use of force, could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.” (Chapter 
II, 15). The original document can be found at the following address: 
    http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/78340.pdf  
7 For a distinction between political pacifism and its integral and intransigent form, see Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre 
entre les nations, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1962, p.693. 
8 The first date is the year during which the treaty was opened to signature; the second is the year of its entry into force.  
9 This posture was confirmed by common position of the European Council 2005/329/PESC on April 25
th 2005, stating 
that: “The European Union continues to regard the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the 
cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in 
accordance with article VI of the NPT and an important element in the further development of nuclear energy 
applications for peaceful purposes”.  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_106/l_10620050427en00320035.pdf  
10 They can be considered as a part of the international regime in compliance with article III.1 of the NPT stating that 
“Each non-nuclear-weapon state Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to 
be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the  
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so have the five states that are attempting to join the Union: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Romania 
and Turkey. In addition, the two European nuclear states, France and Great Britain, were the first 
two nuclear states to ratify the NPT and CTBT.
11 By the same token, this group of states (25 
members plus five candidates) has implemented the additional protocol of the IAEA
12. Furthermore, 
since the last wave of enlargement, this implementation of the most stringent non-proliferation 
control is a pre-requisite for joining the Union. 
 
The term governance can be used because this international norm or regime
13 aims at 
regulating state behaviors without negating their sovereignty. Indeed, in the many different fields of 
foreign policy, the military nuclear policy remains the most intimately linked with national 
sovereignty and independence.  
  First, state adhesion and implementation of the above treaties as tools of governance through 
norms lie on the sovereign dimension of the nuclear weapon.
14 The NPT clearly distinguishes two 
categories of member states, those who possess nuclear-weapon and those who do not, each of them 
implying specific commitments and rewards. It falls to the first category to become partners to the 
second, and share their knowledge and technology for peaceful purposes. The second category 
would benefit from this technology if they refrain from building nuclear weapons. Insofar as 
sovereign states sign this treaty which gives them responsibilities, sovereignty appears as a 
condition of self-restraint. Likewise, the additional protocol of the IAEA can only be applied to 
states that have implemented them. However, once implemented, they allow the inspectors not only 
to control the declared material but also to initiate investigations based on their own suspicion. 
In a nutshell, the EU concept of governance in the field of non-proliferation is a norm 




                                                                                                                                                                  
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from 
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 
11 Both have ratified on April 6
th 1998.  
12 Since December 2005 if we include Slovakia and Estonia. Otherwise, since 30
th April 2004, the Vice President of the 
European Commission, Loyola de Palacio informed the director of IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei of the readiness of all 
the Euratom member states to apply additional protocol to the NPT. "Through this commitment, the EU has shown 
itself to be in the vanguard of states seeking universal coverage of these agreements and consequently the 
strengthening of the international community's efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons", said Loyola de Palacio. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/npd/ip04_602.htm  
13 For a debate about the qualification of the NPT system as an international regime, see Trevor McMorris Tate, 
“Regime Building in the Non-proliferation System”, Journal of Peace Research, vol.27 n°4, November 1990, pp.319-
414 and Michael Brzoska, “Is the Nuclear Non-proliferation System a Regime? A Comment on Trevor McMorris 
Tate”, Journal of Peace Research, vol.29 n°2, May, 1992, pp. 215-220. 
14 The temporal delimitation included in the NPT constitutes a strong limit to this argument. Being opened to signatures 
in 1968, it only considers as nuclear-weapon states those which have tested their weapons before June 1
st 1967. 
15 See Zaki Laïdi, La norme sans la force, l’énigme de la puissance européenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2005, 
p.61.  
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This begins to give us a picture of the European posture regarding non-proliferation issues in 
2006. Nevertheless, what makes it a collective preference? 
 
Assessing the European preference as a source of normative power: a methodological framework. 
 
Three constitutive features of a preference will be proposed and they will be used as means 
to assess the European stance as pictured above. 
  First, a preference has to last for a minimal period of time. Otherwise, it would be a mere 
adaptation to circumstances or to the evolution of power politics. On the one hand, preferences are 
fluid and reactive to the context. On the other, if the concept of collective preference claims any 
scientific validity, one needs to recognize converging general objectives, orientations and ideas of 
what the actors involved believe the world ought to be like in a best case scenario. In other words, a 
genuine European preference requires a convergence of member states preferences. Indeed, one has 
to keep in mind that the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense 
Policy (CFSP/ESDP) is mainly intergovernmental, even if community institutions participate in its 
activities. Unanimity between member states has been the only decision-making system so far.
16  
  Second, a preference must distinguish a European actor from other major actors on the 
international scene.
17 A demonstration that there has in fact been a cleavage between EU and non-
EU members positions adopted throughout history is therefore required.
18 This criterion might seem 
relatively benign. However, the specificity of this preference is inescapable and critical to assessing 
its normative power
19. In fact, the NPT is today the most ratified treaty by states, with only a few 
exceptions: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea since it withdrew in January 2003; 137 states 
have so far ratified the CTBT
20 and the additional protocol of the IAEA is in force in 78 states
21. 
Such figures raise a basic question: is another clear preference supported by major actors on the 
                                                 
16 Since the Amsterdam Treaty, member states have the possibility to choose abstention. In the case, these states are not 
bound by the decision made but recognize that it engages the EU. The decision can be rejected if “qualified 
abstention” represents more than one third of the regular ponderation of votes. (art.23 § 1 of the EU Treaty)  
17 This point is closely akin to a definition of globalization as a confrontation of distinct preferences. 
18 Other possible cleavages could be nuclear-weapon states/ non nuclear-weapon states or neutral states/non neutral 
states; UN Security Council member states / non member states; Nuclear Suppliers Group members / non members; 




19 Shaping the preferences of the others is obviously a means of power, which supposes distinctiveness. That is how an 
EU developing a specific preference could still be powerful. This explanation could be linked with Joseph Nye’s 
concept of soft power. Nye writes that “soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” (J.S. Nye 
Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p.5.) On the limits of the 
characterization of the EU as a soft power only, see Zaki Laïdi, op. cit., pp. 26-35. 
20 http://www.ctbto.org/ This figure is valid on November 13
th, 2006, the day when Montenegro ratified the Treaty.  
21 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html This figure is from the October 23
rd 2006 report, the 
latest when this paper is written.  
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international scene?
22 These alternative preferences will be defined mainly in reference to this series 
of treaties but a political look at the nuclear doctrines and policies may be useful to confirm the 
consistency of these preferences. If there are only a few states outside of the NPT, even fewer 
publicly recognize that they want to break its rules.   
  Third, as a normative power asset, this preference should be effective
23, at least politically 
and judicially. This point may seem contradictory to the second, insofar as the preference for 
governance through norms aims at a goal of being widely, if not universally, shared
24. As a 
consequence, the criteria of efficacy and distinctiveness seem incompatible. Nevertheless, the 
difficulty disappears as soon as one considers that a powerful alternative suffices to constitute a 
distinctive subject in international politics and, at the same time, an objective for a normative power 
in Europe. This is why it is necessary to determine the preferences of four great powers: the United 
States, Brazil, India and Japan. 
  These three dimensions, durability, distinctiveness and efficacy constitute the three parts of 
the paper.  
A.  A minimal but durable preference for it has endlessly been renegotiated between members 
 
As characterized above, the European preference for non-proliferation as an international 
norm seems obvious. However, it progressively emerged in the 1980s and always had to be 
renegotiated. It had to cope with the strategic imperatives of two nuclear-weapons states and of the 
rise of anti-nuclear feelings clamoring for disarmament rather than non-proliferation. Even as a 
compromise, this common preference must be assessed in comparison with the growing diversity of 
member states it had to reconcile. 
  Some signs of what would become a preference emerged even before the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP).
25 
                                                 
22 This basic question could receive a basic philosophical answer: one distinctive self fully exists when he is aware of 
what makes it different and manages to be recognized as such by the others. Constituting the EU as an actor of the 
international game thanks to specific preferences requires this type of method.  
23 Of course, assessing the efficiency of an actor in the international area may be very difficult. Some scholars even 
assume that it is strictly impossible, given the multiplicity of causal chains leading to an action. In other words, the 
EU may do its best and even be persuasive but fail at the end of the day because the actor it wanted to influence faced 
stronger constraints that led him to act in different way. Whatever, my notion of efficiency is rather stringent and 
does not deal with intentions or good will. It stands on the idea that being efficient implies two aspects : reinforcing 
the basis of one’s preference in the international area (for example the NPT in the European case) and spreading this 
preference. Another limit of this approach would be the long term effects of secret negotiations that do not 
immediately come to fruition (see the Libyan negotiations with the US and UK). I thank Christian Burckhardt for 
useful insights on this point. 
24 See Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
vol.40 n°2, pp.235-258, above all pp.238-240 and 244-245. That is how the entity that adopts a preference for 
governance through norms can still be powerful and influent internationally. See also footnote 20. 
25 For a deeper and more detailed historical account of European Non-proliferation Policy, see Harald Müller (dir.), A 
European Non-proliferation Policy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, A Survey of European Nuclear Policy 1985-
1987, Londres, MacMillan, 1989, European Non-proliferatoin Policy 1988-1992, Bruxelles, European Interuniversity 
Press, 1993, European non-proliferation policy 1993-1995, Bruxelles, European Interuniversity Press, 1996.  
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Until the 1980s, disarmament was mainly bilateral and the European member states did not 
even share any ground on which to build a common vision. At that time, France and Spain were not 
even parties to the NPT and were opposed to its logic
26; while both France and Germany, among 
others, continued exporting sensitive facilities.  
One important step was taken in 1981 when the Europeans decided to deal with the non-
proliferation issue inside the European Political Cooperation framework. This led to a joint 
statement by the European Community in the IAEA Secretary General’s Annual Report in 1983.
27 
Then, cooperation increased significantly between 1985 and 1990. The first diplomatic coming 
together of the European member states dates back to November 20
th, 1984 when the London 
directives on nuclear exportations were jointly adopted.
28 Then, in 1987, the EU-12 made its first 
common declaration at the UN conference on pacific uses of atomic energy. Subsequently, it made 
another at the 33
rd General conference of the IAEA two years later.   
Significant steps were made just after the end of the Cold War: the Gulf War put nuclear 
proliferation on the international agenda through a German initiative at the Special UN Security 
Council in January 1992
29 and the main tools of the just-born CFSP, presidential declarations, 
common positions and common strategies and action plans would be used to make public a rising 
European preference. Above all, France seemed to make a move towards a convergence of 
European preferences. Previously, it had neither signed the Partial test Ban Treaty in 1963 nor was 
involved in the Zangger Committee, the first nuclear export-control regime. Moreover, it had been 
opposed to a common European position at the fourth Review Conference of the NPT in 1990. On 
August 3
rd, 1992, France signed this treaty
30 and, in 1994, the EU started to promote widespread its 
prorogation
31.  
However, on June 13
th, 1995, French president Jacques Chirac announced that his country 
would start a last series of nuclear tests. He was met with strong opposition within Europe. On 
December 12
th, 1995, a UN General Assembly resolution condemned the tests: the UK was opposed 
to it while Germany and Spain chose abstention. All the other European member states approved of 
the resolution condemning the tests. The two nuclear states then seemed to maintain a specific 
                                                 
26 Camille Grand, The European Union and the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chaillot Paper n°37, Paris, 
2000, p.19. http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai37e.pdf. 
27 Tom Sauer, “How “Common” is European Non-proliferation Policy?”, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of 
Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), 2003, p. 8. 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/edinburgh/ws12/Tom%20Sauer.pdf 
28 These directives date back to 1975 and aimed at framing a common export control policy between party States. The 
text of the complete 1984 declaration can be found in Harald Müller (ed.), Blocking the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 
New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, pp.127-129. 
29 On January 31
st, 1992, the UN Security Council identifies nuclear proliferation as “a threat for peace and international 
security”. This assessment is referred to in UNSC resolution 1540. 
30 As for the United Kingdom, the other nuclear-weapon state in the Union, it was a party to the NPT since its opening 
to signature on July 1
st, 1968. 
31 The decision of a joint action was adopted at the Corfu summit, June 24-25
th, 1994.  
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preference so as to be distinguished from the rest of the Union. However, France adopted a rather 
transparent stance and, after its tests, led the coalition of the signatories of the CTBT and developed 
programs of simulation instead of real tests, strengthening the European view. But the nuclear-
weapon state’s specificity would soon reappear. 
In the second half of the 1990s, “The lack of any search for a European policy and a 
dynamic consensus that produces new initiatives [was] particularly striking.”
32 A limited number 
of actions have been taken during this period: a joint action on transparency of export control in the 
nuclear field was passed on April 29
th, 1997
33; and common positions were adopted on nuclear and 
ballistic non-proliferation in South Asia after the Indian and Pakistani tests of 1998 (October 26
th)
34 
on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (July, 29
th, 1999
35). This last position was renewed in 2003 
and accompanied by an action plan
36. In 2000, at the NPT Review Conference, the EU talked with 
one single voice.
37 
Then the September 11
th 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and, in 2003, the preference was 
formalized. After the second Iraqi war, the EU, successful in its assistance to Russian disarmament, 
released two main doctrinal documents: the strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the European Security Strategy.
38. It was followed, in 2004, by a common position 
for the universalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements on the field of weapons of 
mass destruction. Finally, the EU stated a common position in 2005, with an interesting proposal to 
reform article X of the NPT so that withdrawal would become harder.
39  
Nevertheless, this unity was torn apart and most EU states did not reiterate this posture in 
their separate national interventions
40. France followed the US position on disarmament; Sweden 
                                                 
32 Camille Grand, The European Union and the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., p.29. 
33 Joint action 1997/288/CFSP of April 29
th, 1997 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997E0288:EN:HTML  
34 Council Common Position 1998/606/CFSP of October, 26
th, 1998  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998E0606:EN:HTML  
35 Council Common Position 1999/533/CFSP of July 29
th, 1999                                                                                    
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999E0533:EN:HTML  
36 See Council Decisions 2003/567/CFSP of July 21
th, 2003 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2001/l_099/l_09920010410en00030003.pdf  
and 2001/286/CFSP of April 9
th, 2001  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l_192/l_19220030731en00530053.pdf 
implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP relating to the European Union's contribution to the promotion of 
the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999E0533:EN:HTML   
37 Bruno Tertrais, “The European Union and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?”, International 
Spectator, vol.40 n°3, July-September 2005, pp.45-57, p.47. 
38 It is worth noting that a personal representative of the high representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Mrs Annalisa Giannella, was appointed on October 10
th 2003.  
39 Harald Müller, “A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference”, International 
Spectator, vol.40 n°3, July-September 2005, pp.33-44, p.43. 
40 William C. Potter, “The NPT Review Conference: 188 states in Search of Consensus” International Spectator, vol.40 
n°3, July-September 2005, pp.19-31, p.24.  
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and Ireland
41 worked with the New Agenda Coalition and the Netherlands acted in three different 
groupings: the EU, the G-10 and a “NATO-7 group” of his own making.
42 This clearly exemplifies 
that some European member states remain members of other groups dealing with non-proliferation 
with different agendas. This last element tends to nuance the picture that appeared before, and 
seemed slightly teleological. Present-day European non-proliferation policy is not a historical 
necessity and has been built through years of political struggle. It is still today an achievement 
which needs to be reaffirmed and deepened by all member states. This preference has emerged as a 
compromise between two radical views and illustrates the decision-making process of an 
intergovernmental European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  
  Indeed, the last two waves of European Union enlargement (1995 and 2004) included 
countries with deeply anti-nuclear public opinions. Then, defending the NPT appeared as a middle 
ground, a modus vivendi, one of whose merits is to avoid the question of disarmament. Between 
proliferation and disarmament, reaching a compromise is possible. But a preference for governance 
through norms still exists since the status quo is not EU policy. It aims at strengthening the 
international non-proliferation regime. Thus, it introduces a commitment towards irreversibility in 
disarmament matters
43 and still favors the reinforcement of multilateral agreements. Moreover, a 
look into the future gives some clues about the strengthening of this preference, given the fact that 
the five candidates have been committed to the same treaties and obligations as present-day 
members. 
While dealing with disarmament, one could contemplate the renouncement of France or the 
UK to its nuclear capability for Europe as a disarmament measure.
44 With this said, the perspective 
seems rather distant. The two European nuclear powers have actively worked together in the field of 
military nuclear technology since 1992. In July 1993, a common commission was even created to 
elaborate joint nuclear policy and doctrine. Both France and the UK (in a much more timid fashion) 
have publicly proposed and stated that their deterrent power could work for the whole Union. The 
White Book of 1972 already read that “France lives in a net of interests that go beyond its borders. 
It is not isolated. Western Europe as a whole cannot but benefit, even indirectly, from the French 
                                                 
41 Remember that in 1959, Ireland introduced a UN General Assembly resolution that would lead to negotiations on a 
Non-proliferation Treaty. 
42 Harald Müller, “A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference”, International 
Spectator, vol.40 n°3, July-September 2005, pp.33-44, p.43. 
43 Bruno Tertrais, “Nuclear Disarmament: How to Make Progress” in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Effective non proliferation, 
the European Union and the 2005 Review Conference, Chaillot Paper n°77, April 2005, pp.27-42, p.34. 
http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/Chaillot-Paper-77-NPT-2005-Issues.pdf  
44 This was the “European option” that the anti-nuclear movement defended at the moment when the NPT was being 
negotiated. They feared that the Americans would make the Treaty incompatible with a European deterrent capability 
once the Union has become a federation. Moreover, this could change radically the relation Europe has to the concept 
of power. Indeed, as underlines Zaki Laïdi, (La norme sans la force, l’énigme de la puissance européenne, op. cit.) it 
is not the guarantor of its own security. That is why it cannot have a zero-sum game vision of international relations. 
A European deterrent would make the EU responsible of its own security and, therefore, may change its vision of 
power. But, as we shall see, this scenario is highly improbable.   
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strategy, which constitutes a stable and determining feature for European security.” On June 8
th 
1996, President Chirac proposed a rapprochement[0]: “Considering [0]the existence of different 
sensibilities towards the nuclear weapon in Europe, we do not propose a finished concept, but a 
progressive process, open to partners who wish to participate[0].” In his address on June 8
th, 2001 
at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN), he came back to the enlarged 
deterrent: “It comes to the President of the Republic to appreciate, in a given situation, to what 
extent our vital interests would be affected. This appreciation would take into account the growing 
solidarity among the countries of the European Union.”
45 In the UK, Sir Christophe Mallaby used 
these words in 1996: “The idea that Briton nuclear weapons do not only serve to defend the 
national territory but also to defend Europe is at the heart of the strategy we have applied since we 
have had access to nuclear weapon.”
46  However, neither of them is ready to renounce to its nuclear 
capability for Europe.
47 
This panorama needs to be interpreted through the lens of the original situation and 
differences between member states. It is worth reminding the reader that among the 15 member 
states (between 1995 and 2004), two are nuclear-weapon states (France and the UK), three states 
categorically reject any kind of nuclear technology regardless of its posited peaceful uses (Ireland, 
Austria, Sweden), one of the three having renounced nuclear weaponry.
48 In four of the states, 
nuclear energy remains highly unpopular (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Denmark)
49 and four other 
states hold US nuclear warheads on their territory in spite of nuclear weapons being domestically 
                                                 
45 I translate. In France, the idea reaches a broad consensus beyond political parties In Paris, this idea has existed since 
1963; it was even shared by the opponents to deterrence like Maurice Faure. (See. Yves Boyer, « Quelle place pour le 
nucléaire dans l’Union Européenne ? », Annuaire stratégique et militaire 2005, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2005, pp.71-85.) . 
The latest presidential speech on the French deterrent, given on January 19
th, 2006 did not mention any new element 
regarding the Europeanization of deterrence. 
46 Sir Christophe Mallaby, «  Dissuasion britannique et dissuasion européenne  », Relations internationales et 
stratégiques, n°21, spring 1996, p.115. Our translation. 
47 The UK is very dependent on the US as far as nuclear technology is concerned. As a result, it does not wish to 
envisage any operational concertation outside the NATO framework. See Bernardo Ribeiro, «  le rôle de l’arme 
nucléaire dans la mise en œuvre d’une PECSD » in Jean Klein, Patrice Buffotot, Nicole Vilboux (dir.), Vers une 
politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, défis et opportunités, Paris, Economica, 2003, pp.155-169. 
48 On the Swedish case, see Paul M. Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: the Conduct of a Nuclear Capable Nation 
Without Nuclear Weapons, Santa Monica, California: RAND MR-40, 1994, and his Ph. D. dissertation: Neutralité du 
jour: The Conduct of Sweden’s Security Policy Since 1945, Washington D. C.: The Johns Hopkins Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, 1990. 
49 Ireland and Denmark have signed the NPT at the right moment when it was open to signature; even before joining the 
EU.  
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unpopular (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy)
50. And this leaves aside other cleavages, 
concerning for example civilian electronuclear production.
51  
Some convergence has been achieved but a collective preference reveals itself to be very 
fragile. It appears as a minimal middle ground, unable to remove definitely deep antagonisms 
between nuclear-weapon and non nuclear-weapon states or to supplant previous allegiances.  
 
After establishing to what extent a European preference is consistent, its second main 
feature, namely distinctiveness, has to be considered. 
 
 
B.  A distinctive preference in comparison to other major powers in the international arena. 
 
Various criticisms of treaty based non-proliferation may be distinguished.
52 The treaty does 
not constitute an effective protection against proliferation, because one can always withdraw thanks 
to article X (as demonstrated by North Korea, 2003), or because an extensive interpretation of 
article IV.1 can perfectly lead to the building nuclear weapons. This treaty is a pact of confidence 
between its members and this trust has suffered from the successive revealed violations (Libya, Iraq 
before 1991, North Korea); sanctions do not exist – article III of the Treaty implies that member 
states conclude guarantee agreements with the IAEA – or are rarely enforced (China selling nuclear 
technology to Pakistan just after signing the NPT, North Korea again until 2003). When they do, 
they imply the UN Security Council and are not directly linked with the implementation of the 
NPT, as in the case of Iraqi disarmament by UNSCOM after a military defeat in 1991. Above all, 
the treaty maintains a rigid inequality between nuclear-weapon states, which do not comply with 
their commitment to disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon states, which only have to restrain 
                                                 
50 Marie-Hélène Labbé, « Y a-t-il une politique européenne de non-prolifération nucléaire ? », Politique étrangère, 
3/1997, pp.307-319. Germany is a good example of the difficulties faced during the writing of the NPT. It required 
measures of disarmament and détente, security insurance and equal treatment in a memorandum. R. Barzel, head of 
the Christian-democrat parliamentary group, took the opponents’ parole to New Delhi to build a front of refusal. 
Germany finally became a party state on November 28
th 1969. See Georges Fischer, La non prolifération des armes 
nucléaires, Paris, LGDJ, 1969, pp.76-79. 
51 Apart from these considerations on preferences regarding the governance of nuclear world order, some geopolitical 
trends tend to suggest that this posture could last for long. In 2005, Europe was not threatened yet by Iranian missiles. 
But, since then, progress has been made and the threat has appeared. The debate on the integration of Turkey in the 
Union seems crucial in that matter. Indeed, a nuclear Iran and a Europe including Turkey would mean a nuclear 
frontier for Europe. Bruno Tertrais, “The European Union and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?”, 
op. cit. p.46. 
52 See Serge Sur, “Non-proliferation and the NPT Review”, International Spectator, vol.40 n°3, July-September 2005, 
pp.7-18 et Bruno Tertrais, « Forces et faiblesses du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires », Questions 
internationales n°13, May-June 2005, pp.46-54.  
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themselves
53. This inequality is all the more unbearable as several nuclear-weapon states remain out 
of the NPT (Israel, India, and Pakistan). 
From these criticisms, one could distinguish three alternative preferences about the future of 
nuclear world order and the way to deal with this issue and one ambiguous position. I do not aim at 
assessing concurrent policies but rather at showing that they reveal different preferences. 
 
-  The first one would be a preference for deproliferation and disarmament. The states 
sharing this preference are committed to the same treaty bodies as the Europeans but 
their stance is more stringent and impatient. This sometimes leads to an opposition to 
present-day non-proliferation regime. Brazil looks as a case in point of this group. 
From this stance, one can derive ambiguous positions. If a national nuclear posture 
cannot in itself be a preference in my meaning of the term, it can be contradictory to the 
publicly stated preference. Japan is a puzzling case that will be exposed in further 
details. It shares the commitments and wishes suggested below but underlines that it 
could easily build nuclear weapons if national security considerations forced it to. What 
could one think of such a preference, which can be contradicted if necessary? 
-  The second clear preference advocates counter-proliferation rather than non-
proliferation. More accurately, it advocates non-proliferation as a status quo objective of 
power politics. It implies the refusal to be bound by the NPT disarmament obligations 
and the IAEA safeguard agreements. The US is the case in point. 
-  The third preference could be labeled preference for bilateral rather than multilateral 
commitment regarding proliferation. Such a stance is close to the US position but even 
more radical: being part of this category implies to sign none of the treaties related to 
non-proliferation. These features fit the Indian preference.  
 
Brazil: preference for deproliferation and disarmament  
 
Brazil renounced a military clandestine nuclear program, perhaps only alleged, with the 
“Buenos Aires declaration” on November 28
th 1990. Then, it ratified the NPT and the CTBT
54, and 
became a party state to the Tlatelolco treaty. It has even adopted a new constitution that underlines 
these commitments. Advocating compliance with the commitments to disarmament (art. VI of the 
NPT), and noticing that no significant move occurred in the world since 1996, Brazil does not put 
                                                 
53 Such a criticism hides a classical bias concerning proliferation. It suggests than any state technologically capable of 
developing nuclear weapons is willing to do so. Beyond the South African case of a voluntary renouncement to a 
nuclear arsenal, recent developments in research on the causes of proliferation reject this assumption. See Jacques E. 
C. Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
54 Annex 2 State, it signed the CTBT on September 24
th 1996 and ratified it on July 24
th 1998.   
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much trust in the present-day non-proliferation regime. Thus, it never signed the IAEA additional 
protocol. During the 2000 Review Conference, it was one of the most important members of the 
New Agenda Coalition, which also included Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa 
and Sweden. This coalition tended to over-interpret the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, 
suspecting that the US would effectively start a new campaign of nuclear tests soon. Notice that two 
EU member states, namely Ireland and Sweden, participate in this coalition.
55 The final hours of 
negotiations in the 2000 Review Conference strongly opposed the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 
and the nuclear-weapon states. The NAC members wanted everybody to agree on the fact that 
existing norms had not brought about the abolishment nuclear weapons.
56 And, in 2000, such a 
group was able to forge a consensus
57.  
Once again, teleology is a very tempting trap. One must not forget that states may reconsider 
their nuclear choices. Indeed, a uranium enrichment plant at Resende, Brazil was recently suspected 
of hiding proliferation intentions.
58 This ambiguity leads us to the second case. 
 
Ambiguous Japan: Virtual Deterrence and the choice of the edge. 
 
Japanese ambiguity deserves to be underlined. At first sight, Japan shares the preference of 
the New Agenda Coalition (and Brazil as exposed above). Especially since the mid 1990s, it is 
favorable to complete nuclear disarmament and advocates the creation of a nuclear free zone in 
South Asia. It has ratified the NPT and CTBT, and has implemented the additional protocol of the 
IAEA; it participates in the “group of 21”, that clamors for nuclear disarmament and the creation of 
a special committee at the UN to deal with disarmament
59; it supports any treaty establishing a 
nuclear free zone and agreements on limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. Last but not 
least, it made a proposal that would allow the IAEA to submit a matter of proliferation to the 
Security Council. This proposal included the option of invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations 
                                                 
55 It can be taken as another example of the achievement joint actions and common positions represent. 
56 Harald Müller, op. cit., p. 40. 
57 William C. Potter, op. cit., p. 21. On the contrary, the coalition itself was highly divided at the 2005 Review 
Conference between its members that also participate in the non aligned movement and those who do not. 
58 Liz Palmer and Gary Milhollin, “Brazil’s Nuclear Puzzle”, Science, October 22
nd, 2004 
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2004/BrazilsNuclearPuzzle.htm and Claire Applegarth, “Brazil: IAEA 
reach inspection agreement”, Arms Control Today, January-February 2005. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-
02/Brazil.asp  
59 The booklets from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide various good examples of Japanese commitments towards 
non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, his struggle against the production of fissile materials and his involvement in 
denuclearization in Russia. See for example Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament and Non-proliferation Policy, April 2004, especially pp.24-30; 102-106; 109-
111; 116-126. The reader must keep in mind the strategic implications of such an objective. If ever the world were 
back to a pre-nuclear era (a dream that died with the Baruch Plan in 1946), Japan would appear as the main military 
power in its area. Anyway, such a stance improves its reputation, diverts from its plutonium programme and hides its 
virtual deterrent capacity without weakening it.  
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Charter, triggering the possibility of military action against the offending proliferators.
60 If it is 
sometimes close to European positions, it has more to do with a traditional “constitutional 
pacifism”
61 than with any shared preference.
62 Indeed, from the beginning, Japan – like some other 
non-nuclear weapon states and in particular the New Agenda Coalition– distrusted the NPT. That is 
why it kept its massive plutonium stockpile and asked for a review of the NPT and renewal of its 
membership every five years. 
However, since 1994, the official Japanese authorities have publicly admitted that they do 
not want to build nuclear weapons but have the technical capability to do so. It suggests that a bomb 
could be assembled in a very short period of time if needed.
63 It is in this way that its virtual 
deterrence works without any breach of its international commitments.
64 
Consequently, Japan maintains a rather schizophrenic and opportunistic stance which mixes 
a radical commitment towards disarmament, close to the one advocated by the New Agenda 
Coalition, and at the very same time a position as a virtual proliferator. This is why, politically 
speaking, it has never moved closer to the New Agenda Coalition, while supporting almost its entire 
agenda.
65 However, Japan has had many opportunities to go nuclear and has not chosen to do so. 
The fact that it is the only country in history to have suffered from nuclear strikes makes it highly 
unlikely that it decides to go nuclear explicitly. Indeed, even if the atomic bomb is a “no use 
weapon”, the credibility of a deterrent posture implies that you are ready for nuclear retaliation if 
necessary. It is not less true in the case of a “weak-against-the-strong” deterrence posture like the 
one Japan would adopt. I do not think that Japanese culture is ready to such a change. In 1995, the 
Japanese Defense Agency restated in a secret report that developing nuclear weapons would 
damage Japan’s national and regional security interests.
66 Japanese public opinion is still radically 
                                                 
60 Jean-Paul Joubert, David Cumin, Le Japon : puissance nucléaire ?, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2003, p.190. 
61 Japanese pacifism is heavily armed: since the end of the eighties, while defence spending has been downsized all over 
the world, including in the US (a new increase will occur in the mid 90s), Japan only has only slowed its increase. 
Ibid., p.175. 
62 Masaru Tamamoto, “Is the Rise of China Detracting from Japan as a Normative Power ?”, presentation given at the 
conference “Are European Preferences Shared by Others? The Fate of European Norms in a Globalized World” at 
CERI, Paris, June 24
th,2006. He pertinently adds that if Japan sometimes shares political views and even preferences 
with the Europeans, it does no consider the origin of such preferences as coming from Europe.  
63 Jean-Paul Joubert, David Cumin, op. cit., pp.10-12 ; 77-88. See also Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 
“Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, (eds.), The 
Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004, pp. 218-253. 
64 Of course, traditional deterrence with delayed retaliation would be meaningless. It works because it warns potential 
agressors or failing defenders that they could face not a nuclear retaliation but another nuclear power in the area. 
65 See Anthony Difilippo, “Japanese Security Policy and the New Agenda Coalition – Tokyo’s Nuclear Disarmament 
Dilemma”, paper prepared for the 2002 International Studies Association Convention, New Orleans, March 23-27, 
2002. http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/difilippo.html   
66 For a more accurate of 2004 doctrine revision, rejecting once again the possibility of a national deterrent, see 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm For an opposite view, considering that this posture is 
compatible with Japanese culture, see Jean-François Daguzan, “La dissuasion et le maître du sabre”, Stratégique, 49, 
1, 1991, pp.185-201.   
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opposed to any kind of nuclear device.
67 This posture of virtual deterrent only suggests that 
Japanese authorities feel more insecure and are not sure about an American nuclear retaliation in 
case of a strike against them. Nevertheless, every power in the area except Russia has adopted a “no 
first use” doctrine. So, the diplomatic costs of a nuclear turn, the absence of a clear and present 
military threat and the possibility to rely on future anti-missile devices enable one to think that 
Japan will maintain its preference for the nuclear edge.  
If the Japanese were to perceive North Korea as an hostile power, things could change. In 
February 2003 outgoing South Korean President Kim Dae-jung warned that the North’s activities 
could force South Korea and Japan to reconsider their stances on nuclear weapons. After North 
Korea launched seven missiles above the Sea of Japan on July 5
th, 2006 local time and did not abide 
by the UNSC resolution condemning it, the Japanese government threatened to freeze any North 
Korean assets in its banking system. In spite of the North Korean nuclear test of October 2006, 
Japan followed the USA and South Korea in not considering North Korea as a nuclear power.
68 No 
sooner had Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso called for a debate on the possibility of a Japanese 
deterrent than all the political opponents unanimously asked for his dismissal. The opposition 
remains as well in the public opinion as among the politicians, even if the Prime Minister refused to 
fire his Foreign Affairs Minister. 
Japan remains on the edge, always maintaining a stance that is perfectly compatible with 
“constitutional pacifism”.
69 In cases like this, national nuclear policy weakens the preference it 
displays internationally. The recent evolution of the strategic partnership with the US and the rise of 
a military nationalism in the country have questioned the future of the fifty-year-old “constitutional 
pacifism”. What looked like a useful US nuclear umbrella now seems mainly to deter Japan itself 
from going nuclear, so that the US still has a say in its foreign policy. This leads us to the third case. 
                                                 
67 On November 20
th, Agence France Presse reported that 80% of the 3000 Japanese that had been surveyed the  week 
before were opposed to a national deterrent 
http://www.cyberpresse.ca/article/20061120/CPMONDE/61120215/1033/CPMONDE  
68 Associated Press, http://permanent.nouvelobs.com/etranger/20061107.FAP2733.html?1533  
69 This preference was called “asymptotic strategy” by G. Quester during the Cold War. See G. Quester, “Some 
Conceptual Problems in Nuclear Proliferation”, American Political Science Review n°66, 2, 1972, pp.490-497. It 
consisted in owning and dispersing all elements of a ballistic and atomic capability except the warheads.  
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The United States: a recent preference for counter-proliferation 
  
As the founding father of arms control
70, at least as responsible as the EU for the indefinite 
prorogation of the NPT in 1995, the US keeps cooperating with the EU as shown in the European 
summit of June 20
th 2005. It concluded various shared initiatives perfectly compatible with 
European preferences
71. There were four common objectives : building a common consensus 
favorable to nuclear non-proliferation ; strengthening the NPT – by jointly supporting the respect of 
commitments and the universalization of the Treaty –; strengthening the IAEA; promoting the 
implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1540 on the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.
72 
However, this picture hides a major shift in the US non-proliferation policy. With the rise of 
the Republicans, since the legislative election of 1994, the US has adopted a counter-proliferation 
policy which upsets the system of arms control in many dimensions. It quasi-exclusively consists of 
unilateral or bilateral initiatives
73, whereas the European preference supports “effective 
multilateralism” through treaty law and the United Nations system.
74 The US administration 
interprets the non-proliferation regime so as to justify a selective interventionism, while at the same 
time neglecting its obligations. Besides, the failure of the NPT Review Conference of 2005 is likely 
to reinforce its conviction that “coalitions of the willing” are the best way to achieve non-
proliferation goals. This policy shift has at least three founding acts
75. First, on December 16
th, 
1998, English and US governments initiated operation Desert Fox without the approval of the UN 
Security Council and bombed Iraqi sites that were suspected of containing weapons of mass 
destruction. This time, the “special relationship” appeared as a rival to a European common 
preference. Second, in July 1999, the US Congress passed the National Missile Defense Act which 
could upset existing deterrent equilibriums, and to introduce weapons in space, contrary to previous 
                                                 
70 I do not have space enough to insist on the active role of the US regarding the non-proliferation policy during and 
after the Cold War. In 1992, they decide a moratorium on nuclear tests; after the fall of the Eastern bloc, they offer 
alternatively promises of economic aid and security insurances to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine so that they give 
back to Russia ex-soviet arsenal remaining on their territory and sign the NPT. In the 1990s, they downsize their 
strategic arsenal within the framework of agreements with Moscow. 
71 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050620.html  
72 See also the second pillar “non proliferation” in the National Security to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,  
December 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf  
73 See the first pillar of the National Security to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, “counter-proliferation” that 
paves the way for “preemptive measures […] to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons 
are used.” (p.3) See also Ghassan Salamé, « mort de l’arms control, apogée de la contre-prolifération » in Quand 
l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005, pp.303-311.  
74 See the European Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction chapter II.A. Note that many 
observers have blamed this opposition between the EU and the US for gearing the development of an integrated non-
proliferation policy, the Europeans often only reacting critically to what Washington does. See Bruno Tertrais, “The 
EU and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?”, op. cit., p.55 and Tom Sauer, op. cit., p.13. 
75 William Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper n°370, London, IISS, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, pp.50-51.  
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treaties.
76 Third, on October 13
th, 1999, the US Senate rejected the CTBT and the Bush 
administration has clearly stated that it would not put it forward for ratification once again, even if it 
was one of the political conditions of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995
77. Similarly, the 
additional protocol of the IAEA has been signed but is not in force yet. 
Further decisions of the current administration reveal a restrictive vision of the NPT that 
only takes into account its non-proliferation side and neglects the commitment to disarmament. In 
February 2004, the US restricted the right to have access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes 
requiring that all non-nuclear-weapon states that do not yet dispose of reprocessing or enrichment 
technology should only be offered fuel guarantees by present technology holders.
78 This is a clear 
denial of the right guaranteed by article IV of the NPT.
79 This makes the treaty a status quo 
framework, freezing existing distribution of power in nuclear matters instead of a framework of 
evolution towards a more equal distribution of nuclear energy in the way it was originally 
conceived. The obligation of disarmament included in article VI was also explicitly denied by the 
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. In his “Statement to the 
Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference”, John R. Bolton 
said: “We cannot divert attention from the violation we face by focusing on article VI issues that do 
not exist.”
80 Arms control does not seem to be on the US agenda anymore since December 13
th, 
2001, when the government unilaterally denounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that had been 
signed with the Soviet Union in 1972 to develop their National Missile Defense.
81 This bilateral 
treaty, which is not part of the non-proliferation regime, was considered as a “pillar of international 
stability” in the final declaration of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT.
82 
While the EU associates its preference for governance through norms with a commitment to 
non-reversal in disarmament, the US shifts from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to a 
                                                 
76 The Space Preservation Act was introduced for the second time to the United States House of Representatives by 
Congressman Dennis Kucinich on December 8
th, 2003. But the US representatives are still reluctant to support the 
ban of weapons in space. However, the United States signed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies in 1967. Its fourth 
article exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits 
their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, 
and fortifications. If the National Missile Defense came to be enforced, this would take away the US preference from 
the EU even more. For a European view, see Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, “La militarisation de l’espace : perspective 
européenne”, Annals of Air and Space Law, vol.XXIV, 2004, pp.357-376. For a recent assessment of the US missile 
defense, see Nicolas de Boisgrollier, “La défense antimissile américaine : science ou fiction?”, Questions 
internationales n°20, July-August 2006, pp.97-103. 
77 Harald Müller, op. cit., p.39. The Clinton administration promised to ratify it as a commitment to disarmament. 
78 Ibid., p.41. 
79 On March 7
th, 2005, President Bush openly declared that he distrusted powers that pretend to develop civil nuclear 
activities, what is strictly contradictory with article IV of the NPT. 
80 Quoted in Bruno Tertrais, “Nuclear Disarmament: How to Make Progress” in Burkard Schmitt (ed.), Effective non-
proliferation, the European Union and the 2005 Review Conference, Chaillot Paper n°77, April 2005, pp.27-42, p.31. 
81 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/images/20011213-4.html  
82 Harald Müller, op. cit., p.39. However, Thérèse Delpech questions its efficiency in terms of limitation of weapons. 
See Thérèse Delpech, « Les défenses anti-missiles et la sécurité internationale au XXI
ème siècle », note de l’Institut 
Français des Relations Internationales n°32, mars 2001.  
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Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed on May 24
th, 2002, which does not imply 
such a commitment. Also of significant importance, the SORT does not include any verification 
provisions. 
Even the Proliferation Security Initiative
83 (PSI) launched by President Bush on May 31
st 
2003, functioning as a coalition of the willing, remains outside the NPT and therefore reinforces 
doubts about its effectiveness. This remains true even if its legitimacy seems to grow.
84 More 
generally, there is no mention of multilateral initiatives in the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 and 
the US and Iran can be held responsible for the failure of the Review Conference of 2005.
85  
US unilateralism, or classical power politics, that lies under the preference for counter-
proliferation also appears in its ad hoc positions towards the demands for nuclear technology. Iran, 
Iraq and Libya, would-be proliferators, have been stigmatized as an “axis of evil” by the US 
President in January 2002 or by John Bolton four months later.
86 On the contrary, the US has never 
raised the issue of the Israeli arsenal
87. John Bolton even publicly contemplated preventive strikes 
against Bushehr plants in Iran
88 before Condoleeza Rice denied these intentions
89.  
In the National Security Strategy of September 2002, the US declared that it wanted to build 
“a strong relationship with India”
90. Therefore, the administration negotiated
91 and signed on March 
2
nd 2006 an agreement on privileged civilian nuclear cooperation.
92 Of course, India has not signed 
the NPT, so it cannot violate it. There is no need to exaggerate the risks of proliferation in South 
                                                 
83 Andrew C. Winner, “Proliferation Security Initiative: the New Face of Interdiction”, The Washington Quarterly, 
spring 2005, pp.129-143. 
84 It has been endorsed by the G8 global partnership and accepted by the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenge and Change in its report entitled A more Secure World : Our Shared Responsibility (New York : 
United Nations, 2004), p.45. 
85 William C. Potter, op. cit., pp.26-28. 
86 They all have ratified the NPT and violated it 
87 Of course, Tel Aviv has not signed the NPT, therefore has not violated it. Nonetheless, its silence remains ambiguous. 
The official doctrine, dating back to 1965, still stipulates that Israel does not possess any nuclear weapons and will 
not be the first country to introduce them in the Middle East. In 1986, an engineer named Vanunu revealed to the 
Sunday Times the existence of an Israeli nuclear programme for which he himself had worked.  
88 The Times, July 17
th and 27
th, 2004, quoted in Eileen Denza, “Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European 
Union and Iran”, European Foreign Affairs Review, n°10, 2005, pp.289-311, footnotes 52 and 53. 
89 “Flirting with Armageddon”, The Observer, February 20
th, 2005. 
90 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.27. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf  
91 The negotiations started on July 18
th, 2005. 
92 This agreement has been approved by the House of Representatives on July 26
th 2006 by 369 voices against 68. It 
stipulates that the US administration is going to work with New Delhi in the field of civilian nuclear energy. In return 
for it, Delhi agrees to place 14 of its 22 plants under the monitoring of the IAEA. Of course, the agreement implies 
that India does not export nuclear technology susceptible to enter in the building of an atomic bomb. It also has to 
maintain the moratorium it decided. The US Senate still has to approve the agreement. On October 3
rd, 2006, the 
White House announced it adjourned without doing so, but still hopes that it will pass during the November session. 
Sources: interview between Thérèse Delpech and Sumit Ganguly, Paris, CERI, May 16
th, 2006 and Olivier Guillard 
(entretien avec), "Le lobby pro-indien a réussi à convaincre Bush", Le Nouvel Obs.com, July 27
th, 2006. Henry 
Sokolski even suggests that if one sticks to the letter of the NPT, concluding this deal with India is violating the US 
commitment to article I of the treaty: not to provide nuclear assistance to a state that is not considered as a nuclear-
weapon state. And the treaty does not recognize India as such. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10731/usindia_nuclear_deal.html   
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Asia to understand that this agreement rewards a state that chose not to sign the NPT
93. Moreover, 
such an agreement even further weakens the normative power of the NPT by lowering the incentive 
to stick to one’s commitments. Indeed, cooperation in civilian nuclear matters appears as a reward 
for effective non-proliferation of non-nuclear-weapon states (art. IV.2). India has not violated the 
treaty since it never signed it, but India has not made any effort to contribute to its further 
implementation either, as will be discussed later in this article. Nevertheless, the current US 
administration signed an agreement that would give India what is supposed to be a reward for state 
parties to the NPT who have met their obligations. And the US is not in a good position to 
formulate any requirement regarding the signature of the CTBT for instance. All this goes against 
the efforts the Europeans made during the 2005 Review Conference to limit free riding. The 
Europeans proposed to define strict rules about the eventual withdrawal from the treaty, so that 
those willing to use this right could not benefit from international cooperation anymore, although 
none of their proposals were accepted
94. This US-India deal leads to the last case. 
 
India: bilateral and selective commitment  
  
The efforts of New Delhi regarding the spread of nuclear technology and know-how are 
widely recognized
95, and it does not want to appear as a maverick in this matter. As a result, in 
September 2005, it voted for the IAEA resolution condemning Iran and, in February 2006, also for 
the one that asked the Director General of the Agency to transmit the Iranian file to the IAEA. Even 
if some observers argue that the conditions of the deal with the US are going to strengthen nuclear 
safety in India, it reiterated its refusal to include the complete test ban in its agreement with the 
United States on April 17
th 2006.  
Indeed, India has not ratified the CTBT, and it is one of only three states not to have signed 
nor ratified the NPT, the other two being North Korea and Pakistan. The reason for this is well-
known: the treaty recognized China as a nuclear power, but not India. New Delhi even confessed 
that it had no interest in a death of the NPT.
96 However, it has not signed the IAEA additional 
protocol. 
                                                 
93 Sumit Ganguly lays emphasis on the “robust export regime” of India. Sumit Ganguly, “A New Chapter in Indo-US 
Relations ?”, IDDS Commentaries, March 21
st, 2006, 
http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/Perspective/IDSS0182006.pdf That is one of the reasons why he does not 
recognize the critics of a double standard policy that come from Iran or Pakistan. Indeed, when general Musharaf 
asked for a similar agreement between the US and his own country, President Bush clearly refused.  
94 Jean Klein, « prolifération », Ramsès 2006, Paris, Dunod, 2006, pp.255-257. 
95 Even Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution and opponent to the US-India deal, does so. See Strobe 
Talbott, “Good day for India, Bad Day for Non-Proliferation”, YaleGlobal, July 21
st 2005, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/talbott/20050721.htm   
96 Thérèse Delpech, L’Iran, la bombe et l’impuissance des nations, Paris, CERI/Autrement, 2006, p.74. On India, see 
pp.71-77.  
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Be that as it may, non-proliferation in India is considered in a significantly different way 
than in Europe. India chose to participate in treaties or conventions that are outside the non-
proliferation regime as defined below. For example, it is a part of the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material
97. Besides, in a dialogue organized by the European Policy Center 
on June 30
th 2006, Annalisa Giannella, personal representative of the High Representative on Non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stated that: “There is a trend of convergence between 
EU and Indian approach but still some open questions.” He added that unlike India, all EU member 
states support the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and want stronger export controls on nuclear 
equipment and technology.
98 Moreover, India has made no promises to end its production of nuclear 
weapons material, contrary to the five official nuclear weapons states.
99 This production is still 
possible in the eight plants that are not submitted to the IAEA control. That is why Ms Giannella 
added “The EU wants to see what kind of safeguard agreement India will conclude with the IAEA. 
It is also important for the EU that civilian nuclear cooperation does not free up further capability 
for nuclear military programmes. A moratorium on fissile material production for military purposes 
would therefore be very useful.” Beyond the so-called trend of convergence, this reveals a very 
distinct preference. Satisfying the IAEA requirements does not equate to being part of the whole 
non-proliferation regime. Thus, the Europeans statement that they share with India a worldview 
based on multilateralism is a sham.
100 The rapprochement between New-Delhi and Washington 
means a reaffirmation of bilateralism and power politics, at the expense of both the EU and treaty-
based non-proliferation.
101 Above all, the non-ratification of the CTBT by India, China, Pakistan 
and also the United States is very noxious for it. Indeed, the four of them are what is called “Annex 
2 States”. That is to say the treaty will not enter into force
102 without their ratifications.
103. 
 
At least three alternative existing preferences on the international scene reveal the specificity 
of the European project of treaty-based multilateral governance of non-proliferation. However, 
                                                 
97 This IAEA convention discussed in the end of the 1970s is not yet in force. Most present-day member states of the 
EU or candidates for joining the Union had already signed it. 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml  
98 http://www.theepc.be/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=591  
99 Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, “U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation. A Strategy for Moving Forward”, 
Council Special Report, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006, p.4. 
100 This statement is the basis of the EU-India strategic partnership of 2004 even if Non-proliferation is not considered 
in the same section as multilateralism in the Commission Staff Working Document entitled “An EU-India Strategic 
Partnership”, Brussels, June 16
th, 2004. 
http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/official_documents/2004_communication.pdf  
101 See Christophe Jaffrelot, « Pari américain pour l’Inde », Le Monde diplomatique, September 2006, p.7. 
102 Article XIV.1. 
103 10 states out of 44 still have to ratify it since Vietnam has just done so on March 10
th 2006. China, India but also the 
USA, Iran, and the three states that are not party to the NPT: Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Colombia, Egypt, 
Indonesia are considered as easier cases.  
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many European member states maintain two allegiances, blurring their effective preference (France, 
the UK, Sweden and Ireland)
104  
 
International commitments regarding nuclear non-proliferation 
 
 NPT  CTBT
105  Additional protocol of 
the IAEA
106 
EU (25)  Ratified  Ratified  In force  
Candidates for joining the Union
107 Ratified  Ratified  In  force 
Brazil Ratified  Ratified  Not signed 
Japan Ratified  Ratified  In  force 
The United States  Ratified  Signed  
but not ratified
Signed  
but not in force  
India  Not signed  Not Signed  Not signed 
 
What is now left to be determined is to what extent the European policies have been useful to the 
non-proliferation project considered as a collective preference. Even if the cohesion of the 
Europeans on that subject is irregular and weakens the collective statements of the EU, its ability to 




C.  Some effective policies, but a blurred preference 
 
A balance of the European non-proliferation policy as an implementation of its preference 
has to take into account at least four elements: its juridical consequences for the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, the budgetary provisions that are devoted to such a policy, the shaping of 
other’s preferences it operated and the political co-operations it could initiate in the perspective the 
NPT advocates (non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament).  
 
European achievements: juridical evolutions, conditionality regarding non-proliferation 
and disarmament assistance 
                                                 
104 The preference of Canada should be examined in further research. It ratified the NPT, the CTBT, actually 
implements the IAEA Safeguard Agreements and has rejected the US proposal to participate in their National Missile 
Defense despite the fact that the whole Canadian territory would have been covered by this device. It is also a party 
state to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In 2003, his pledges to global partnership on 
weapons of mass destruction reach nearly 0.8% of its military expenditures, i.e. 0.3% more than the most generous 
European states. http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/GPUpdates/GP_update_2_&_Supplemental.pdf  
105http://www.ctbto.org/s_r/sigrat.dhtml?rat=NA&sig=NA&wcstate=ALL&showsig=YES&showrat=YES&region=AL
L  
106 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html. October 23
rd , 2006 report. 
107 Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia.  
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Two main legal effects can be noticed. First, the indefinite prorogation of the NPT on May 
11
th 1995
108 owes much to the EU. This may be one example of a normative power that Europe 
possesses since the member states lobbied those outside the EU – with a strong help from the US– 
and succeeded. Ireland, Italy, Belgium and Sweden – involved in the EU preparation as it was 
becoming a member on January 1
st 1995 – were at first opposed to the prorogation but gave up in 
front of the tenacity of France, Germany and the UK
109. This can be viewed as a success in the 
framing of common positions. But this event also has its downside: “The focus on the extension 
issue and the great toll the diplomatic campaign took on the limited time and resources of the 
handful of diplomats in each capital charged with this area of policy, prevented any preparation on 
substance, even under two fairly potent presidencies. As a consequence, the Fifteen entered the 
Conference with their national positions only.”
110 Second, The Europeans proposed the 
strengthening of the IAEA’s capacity to control through program (93+2). This evolution is also 
made possible thanks to EU budgetary provisions. In 2004, non-proliferation activities represented 
one quarter of the CFSP budget
111; the Union adopted a Joint Action for support to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and included a financial contribution of €10 million for 3 years in its 
nuclear security program.
112 One of the later similar actions was taken by the EU Council on June 
12
th 2006. It decided to devote an amount of 6,995,000 euros (article 3) to strengthen the IAEA 
efforts in nuclear security and verification
113. As well, more discrete effects must not go unnoticed. 
Thus, “The language contained in [The EU] common position formed the basis for significant 
elements of the text of the Final Document. Despite its low profile on the conference floor, the 
influence of the EU on both the text of the Final Document and the outcome of the [2000 NPT 
Review] conference should therefore not be underestimated.”
114 
Other major effects of this policy come from conditionality, which is not only related with 
joining the Union. For instance, in 1991, European Foreign Ministers adopted guidelines for the 
recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It required “acceptance of all 
relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation”
115. For example, 
                                                 
108 The joint action favorable to this outcome dates back to July 25, 1994. See decision 94/509/PESC of the Council 
http://europa.eu/bulletin/fr/9407/p103004.htm    
109 Tom Sauer, “How “Common” is European Non-proliferation Policy?”, op. cit., p.15. 
110 Harald Müller, “European nuclear non-proliferation after the NPT extension: achievements, shortcomings and 
needs” in Yves Boyer et alii, Europe and the Challenge of proliferation, Chaillot Paper n°24, 1996, p.49. 
111 Non-proliferation provisions amount to €15 millions out of a total budget of €62.6 millions. Figures from the House 
of Lords, quoted in Bruno Tertrais, “The EU and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?”, op. cit., p.51 
112 Council of the European Union, “Implementation of the WMD strategy – annex B: list of priorities for a coherent 
implementation”, December 3
rd, 2004, p.39, quoted in Ibid., p.49. 
113 Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSPof June 12
th, 2006.  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_165/l_16520060617en00200029.pdf  
114 John Simpson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference”, in SIPRI Yearbook, London, Oxford University Press, 2001, 
pp.500-501.  
115 (1992) 31 ILM, pp.1486-1487, quoted in Eileen Denza, op. cit. pp.292-293.  
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the cooperation agreement with Ukraine had not been concluded before the country signed the 
NPT.
116 The same procedure has been used since 1992 with North Korea. On the contrary, the 
Europeans removed their sanctions against Libya which exceeded those decided by the UN Security 
Council after Lybia ratified the CTBT and concluded agreements to dismantle its illegal 
capabilities.
117 Slovakia and Estonia, members of the EU since 2004, did not implement the 
additional protocol of the IAEA. It has been done since December 1
st 2005 inside a group of non 
nuclear European states. Implementing the additional protocol is now a condition for joining the 
Union. It was noticed earlier as an illustration of a preference, but, considered in a historical 
perspective, it also shows European normative power.  
The EU has proved itself rather successful since the end of the Cold War, particularly in the 
field of non-proliferation and disarmament assistance. It includes three different aspects: facilitating 
the dismantlement and destruction of weapons, securing the weapons and other elements by 
preventing theft, demilitarization and conversion of projects.
118 They not only concern nuclear 
weapons, but also chemical and biological ones and long-range missiles. The main operations of 
this kind have been carried out in Russia, under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) program but others are being implemented in Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Uzbekistan. On December 17
th 1999, the EU adopted a joint action establishing a cooperation 
program for non-proliferation and the disarmament of the Russian Federation.
119 
 
When the quest for efficacy blurs the preference 
  
This efficacy must not hide the fact that these programs mix national initiatives and large 
partnerships extended to non-EU States, the European Strategy itself including “Co-operation with 
key partners such as the Russian Federation, Japan and Canada is necessary to ensure a successful 
                                                 
116“Although Brussels has not applied overt economic coercion, EC officials have nevertheless tried to exert pressure 
on Kiev to ratify START 1 and accede to the NPT […].The President-in-Office of the EC Council, Niels Helveg, 
declared in June 1993 that it would be difficult to conclude an agreement with a nuclear Ukraine. The final 
declaration of the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 explicitly refers to Ukraine's international 
commitments, and argues that compliance `is essential for Ukraine's full integration into the international community 
and would promote the development of its relations with the Community and its Member States.”  Peter van Ham, 
Ukraine, Russia and European Security, Chaillot Paper n°13, 1994, part II. 
http://aei.pitt.edu/465/01/chai13e.html#chap3  
117 Ratification was done in January; sanctions removed in October. Those particular sanctions do not reveal divergent 
preferences towards the condemnation of proliferators but a particular sensitivity to terrorism. For more about the 
Libyan case, see Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. Stepping back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper 
n°380, London, IISS, Oxford University Press, 2006.  
118 Marc Finaud and Ian Anthony, “The Role of European Union in International Non-proliferation and Disarmament 
Assistance”, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Occasional Paper Series, n°50, April 2006. They remark that despite 
joint actions, “there is no single overall framework for delivering EU activities. Each of the EU member states that 
has an [International Non-proliferation and Disarmament Assistance] programme maintains its own national control 
over project development, financing and implementation. The European Commission is responsible for financing and 
implementing other relevant programmes, in particular in Russia.” p.12-13. 
119 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/npd/cja99.pdf It was initially adopted for the period 1999-2003, but 
it was prolonged until June 24
th, 2004.    
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outcome of the global fight against proliferation.”
120 This could be considered as another form of 
normative power but it rather reaffirms cleavages between European member states and favors new 
strategic coalitions.   
For instance, in 1999, negotiations with Russia took place in a more bilateral framework: the 
G8 Global partnership on weapons of mass destruction in which the EU pledged one billion euros 
for the years 2002-2012
121. Similarly, the Proliferation Security Initiative, however effective it 
could be, somehow blurs a distinctive European stance. Indeed, 8 member states are among the 11 
initial signatories:
122 Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the UK. 
In a joint declaration on June 20
th 2005, the EU collectively takes over this participation. “PSI 
activities will be consistent with national legal authorities and international law and frameworks, 
many of which, in turn, implement existing non-proliferation structures. The PSI will build on 
existing non-proliferation export control regime efforts to identify and prevent the export of certain 
commodities to WMD and missile programs of proliferation concern. In this regard, the Initiative 
complements and works within the limits of established national and international law, including 
non-proliferation treaties.”
123 This is a general formulation, apparently compatible with a European 
preference. And this initiative was indeed successful: in October 2003, it was permitted to inspect 
the BBC China, which was on its way to Libya, carrying nuclear material. Two months later, the 
country announced its renunciation of nuclear weapons and, later on, accepted international 
inspections
124. Nonetheless, a close cooperation between the UK and the US was much more 
decisive than any European initiative. Anyway, one must not forget that this initiative is outside the 
NPT, which has proved to be the core of the EU preference and, as such, appears as a remedy to its 
inefficiency.
125  
Consequently with its complete endorsement of the PSI, the EU can take advantage of its 
achievements, but blurs what was considered as a common preference. This dilemma may be 
resolved by articulating this initiative with international treaties. At the core of this difficulty lies 
the fundamental problem of reforming the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
                                                 
120European Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, chapter II, section 26. This also raises 
the issue of the compatibility between the different elements of the EU strategy, but I cannot go into it here. 
121 Bruno Tertrais, “The EU and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?”, op. cit., p.50. See also Daniil 
Kobyakov et Vladimir Orlov, “The G8 Global Partnership on Weapons of Mass Destruction: What’s Next”, Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy Occasional Papers Series n°47, June 2005. 
122 Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the United Kingdom. 
123 Official statement on the web page dedicated to the PSI http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/46839.htm  
124 This statement needs to be qualified, the most recent reasearch assessing that neither the PSI nor the war in Iraq were 
responsible for the Libyan decision to renounce to its nuclear weapons even if they may have accelerated it. See Wyn 
Q. Bowen, op. cit, chap.3. See also Bruce W. Jentleson et Christopher A. Whytok, “Who won Libya? The Force-
Diplomacy Debate and its Implications for Theory and Policy”, International Security, vol.30 n°3, winter 2005/2006, 
pp.47-86. A process of secret negotiations between the US, the UK and Libya had started in May 1999, was 
suspended during the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States and resumed in October 2001. It mainly 
focused on Lockerbie bombing settlement and Libyan support to terrorism but made clear that US unilateral sanctions 
would not be lifted without a WMD agreement. 





European crisis-management: North Korea and Iran 
 
Finally, assessing the efficacy of the EU action regarding its preference requires a closer 
look at two difficult cases: North Korea and Iran. The central question remains the following one: in 
its way of dealing with them, has the EU managed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime or to 
spread its will to do so? In this perspective, the failure of others is beside the point. 
Euratom has participated in the negotiations with North Korea since September, 19
th 1997 
and has mainly been critical about the US case-management, which it considered as rewards given 
to proliferators (A total of US$ 2.4 billion given to North Korea through KEDO from 1994 to 
2004
126). This stance seemed consistent but the crisis has almost exclusively been managed by 
Washington. In May 2001, while the Bush administration had interrupted the dialogue with 
Pyongyang, the EU struck up a new dialogue based upon Sweden initiative.
127 However, the 
European intervention did not prevent North Korea from withdrawing the Non-proliferation Treaty 
in 2003.
128 The fact that the Korean withdrawal set a precedent and limited the normative power of 
the treaty must be underlined. Indeed, this power comes from two main elements, the credibility of 
the treaty, that is to say its ability to produce incentives to compliance and sanctions in case of 
violation
129, and its universality. Recent North Korean behavior has damaged both sides. On the one 
hand, the North Korean regime suggested that it had violated its commitments regarding non-
proliferation while it was still a party state. On the other hand, article X, which enables a 
withdrawal with a three months advance notice, had never been used before. As mentioned earlier, 
the EU reformation proposals at the 2005 Review Conference were not accepted. Hence, Iran can 
use this same threat if there is a denial of its “right to enrich uranium”, as clearly stipulated in a 
letter addressed to the UN Secretary General in May 2006.
130 The EU actions did not manage either 
to prevent the nuclear test of last October 9
th. The EU supported Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” 
and intra-Korean rapprochement but after the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in 2003, it only 
                                                 
126 Tiphaine de Champchesnel, Observatoire de la Non Prolifération n°6, April 2006. 
127 Bruno Tertrais, “The EU and Nuclear Non-proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?”, op. cit., p.51. 
128 Either has it prevented it from announcing that it possessed nuclear weapons in February 2005. But one cannot check 
this statement as long as North Korea has not tested its weapons. 
129 This supposes that violation has been noticed. It is another problem related to the action of the IAEA, which failures 
were revealed by what was found in Irak in 1991 and by the revelations of A. Q. Khan.  
130 Associated Press, Teheran, May, 7
th, 2006. http://fr.news.yahoo.com/07052006/5/l-iran-menace-de-se-retirer-du-
tnp.html The letter of the NPT does not explicitly mention a right to enrich uranium but rather a right to use 
peacefully nuclear technology.  
  26
blamed North Korea for its behaviour – as did the USA – and went on supporting Seoul.
131 It is 
difficult to say whether what happened after the test corresponded to the European preference. 
Indeed, the unanimity of the UN Security Council voting the resolution 1718
132 on October 14
th 
2006, imposing sanctions on the regime, asking the Democratic and Popular Republic of Korea to 
renounce its withdrawal of the NPT and not to initiate anymore tests owes much to a general 
rejection of nuclear proliferation and fear of the regime. One could say that it is a multilateral 
treatment of the crisis. However, this test has damaged the credibility of the NPT much too deeply 
for any unanimity of the UNSC to restore it. Afterwards, the Finnish EU President expressed his 
satisfaction after North Korea had announced that it would go back to the negotiation table.
133  
The Iranian case is all the more important as it was one of the first states to sign the NPT 
and to plead for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.
134 It is worth mentioning that the 
Europeans had taken the initiative, even though there was no formal mandate for the troika, namely 
France, Germany and the UK. They went to Teheran for the first time in October 2003, while the 
USA was dealing with the initial aftermath of the war in Iraq and the IAEA was at a dead end, Iran 
having rejected the resolution of the Board of governors of September. An agreement was 
concluded on October 21
st 2003. However, it was almost immediately violated and denounced on 
June 22
nd 2004 in a letter addressed to the three Foreign Ministers. November 14
th 2004 put an end 
to a second wave of negotiations through which Iran considerably downsized the stringency of its 
commitments
135. But this agreement was also violated. The High Representative for European 
CFSP Javier Solana has stood next to the troika since 2005
136. Thanks to his implication, the 
negotiations with Iran have taken a more formalized European form. One has to notice the unity of 
the three European delegations during the three years of negotiation, a cohesion being reinforced by 
the election of a new German chancellor.
137 However, this cannot hide the fact that France rejected 
Mohamed El Baradei’s proposal of a five-year moratorium against the building of new structures 
                                                 
131 Wade L. Huntley, “Rebels without a cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT”, International Affairs, 82: 4, 2006, 
pp.723-742, pp727-728. 
132 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf  
133 Agence France Presse, November 1
st, 2006. 
http://www.cyberpresse.ca/article/20061101/CPACTUALITES/611010980/0/CPSPORTS01   
134 This proposal was originally made by Iran, in July 1974, in front of the UN General Assembly. Egypt finally co-
sponsored the initiative. The resolution 31/71 was finally adopted in 1976 with 130 votes against none and one 
abstention: Israel. The same resolution 32/82 was adopted in 1977 (131 votes for, none against, one abstention) and a 
third time in 1980 (136 votes for, 0 against, one abstention). At the meeting of 2 December 1993, Iran proposed it 
once again. Nader Barzin, L’Iran nucléaire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005, pp.201-202.  This being said, one of course 
has to keep in mind the political implications of such a demand.  
135 For an account of this first period, see Thérèse Delpech, « Trois européens à Téhéran », Politique internationale, 
n°106, hiver 2004-2005, pp.129-143 and « Trois européens à Téhéran (suite et fin ?) », Politique internationale 
n°109, automne 2005, pp.165-176. For a complete chronology, Thérèse Delpech, L’Iran, la bombe et l’impuissance 
des nations, op. cit., pp.119-133. 
136 See the article “Iran requires a collective answer” by French, British, German Ministers of Foreign Relations and 
Javier Solana, High Representative of CFSP, published in the Wall Street Journal on September 22
nd, 2005. 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/articles/86360.pdf  
137 Thérèse Delpech underlines this point in L’Iran, la bombe et l’impuissance des nations, op. cit., p.37.  
  27
able to produce fissile material of military quality jointly with the USA and Iran at the 2005 Review 
Conference of the NPT.
138 Europe has protected Iran from a transfer of its case to the UN three 
times: in November 2003, November 2004 and September 2005
139. In February 2006, when the 
Iranian file was transmitted to the UN Security Council, the Europeans found it very hard to agree 
on what was nothing more than a presidential declaration. The different ultimatums have never been 
respected and no sanctions followed. In other words, every negotiation with Teheran has failed so 
far.
140 On June 6
th 2006, China, Russia and the United States joined the EU3 to make another 
proposal to Teheran. Then on July 31
st 2006, after the director of the IAEA reported that Iran had 
not stopped its enrichment activities, the UN Security Council voted, by fourteen against one, 
Resolution 1696
141 stating that the Islamic Republic had to stop these activities by August 31
st. 
Otherwise, sanctions may be contemplated under article 40 of chapter VII of the UN charter. Iran 
has not complied with the resolution yet. Of course, this policy may not be assessed definitely 
before 2008 or 2009, when Iran is supposed to build its own nuclear capabilities
142. Nonetheless, 
one can already make some statements about the efficacy of the European strategy. Some analysts 
suggest that the initial dialogue was biased insofar as all that Iran wanted was to enrich uranium on 
its own territory whereas the EU, recognizing this legal right, wanted the Iranians to renounce to 
it.
143 Even if it does not cross the nuclear threshold
144, a resolution from the Board of Governors of 
the IAEA on September 24
th 2005 recognized that the Islamic republic already violated its 
obligations to the agency.
145 As a result, the non-proliferation regime is weakened by the Iranian 
behavior and the European policy has not prevented this evolution so far. The argument stating that 
the Europeans have prevented or should prevent the US from waging a war against Iran implies that 
                                                 
138 François Heisbourg reminds us of this fact in his text : « Iran : ce que l’Europe peut encore faire », Telos, May 7
th 
2006 http://www.telos-eu.com/2006/05/iran_ce_que_peut_encore_faire.php  
139 Thérèse Delpech, L’Iran, la bombe et l’impuissance des nations, op. cit., p.40. 
140 One could soften this conclusion noticing that the same can be said about the Russians. That is true but has no 
influence in my perspective. See Thérèse Delpech, «  L’Iran et la bombe  : options de fin de partie  », Politique 
internationale n°110, spring 2006, pp.177-186, p.178. 
141 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement  
142 On these previsions, see Bruno Tertrais, «  Iran: la bombe fin 2008?  », Note de la FRS, May 15, 2006 
http://www.frstrategie.org/barreCompetences/prolifDissuasionDefenses/20060315.pdf and David Albright, “When 
could Iran get the bomb? What we know and what we don’t know about Iran’s nuclear programme”, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, vol.62 n°4, July-August 2006, pp.26-33. The IAEA reports always remain ambiguous. On the one 
hand, even the one released on March 6, 2006 underlines that three years one inspection cannot prove the existence of 
a clandestine nuclear programme. On the other hand, it cannot either guarantee that these activities are totally pacific. 
143 François Géré, L’Iran et le nucléaire, les tourments perses, Paris, lignes de repères, 2006, pp.106-107. 
144 See Bruno Tertrais in Libération, May 13-14
th, 2006. Similarly, Nader Barzin concludes his historical investigation 
on Iranian nuclear programme since the 1970s stating that it will not cross the threshold. See Nader Barzin, op. cit. 
The same diagnosis can be found in François Géré, op. cit., p.141. For a statement that the Iranian want to develop 
nuclear weapons, Thérèse Delpech, op. cit., pp.12-32.  
145  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf  An earlier resolution, dating back to 
November 26, 2003, denounces Iran for hiding its nuclear activities for 18 years and for failing its obligations 
regarding safeguard agreements.  http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf   
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the EU actor is condemned to be reactive and not to have its own non-proliferation policy.
146 




Conclusion: when the norm vacillates, preference for governance through norms cannot 
imply normative power anymore. 
 
A shared commitment to the same series of treaties dealing with non-proliferation can shape 
a common European preference for multilateral governance. It can be opposed to three alternative 
preferences and will remain valid after the 2007 enlargement. In other words, it seems distinctive 
and rather long lasting, even if it appears as the smallest common denominator. It has been 
successful in disarmament assistance and shaping the policies of states willing to join it.  
However, it has not yet proved successful in managing recent proliferation cases. 
Moreover, member states behavior has to be distinguished from the European level. The 
common preference has not solved the conflicting interests of nuclear-weapon states and non-
nuclear-weapon states inside the EU, reminding us that the CFSP/ESDP remains intergovernmental. 
While it initiated the European presence at KEDO to negotiate with North Korea, France
147, 
followed by the UK, contributed to the failure of the Review Conference of May 2005, which 
compromises the European preference and, in doing so, devalued its normative power. 
And the non-proliferation regime actually faces a deep crisis, which endangers the 
credibility of the norm and reveals the failure of those who supported it. Therefore, institutional and 
political factors go together to strongly limit the effective common character of a non-proliferation 
policy. An autonomous actor finds it hard to emerge for two main reasons. Persisting cleavages 
between member states maintaining multiple allegiances and imperatives of broader coalitions 
including the US put Europe in a secondary position.  
If it wants to emerge as a strong global actor, the EU has to preserve above all the basis of 
its international action, i.e. the NPT, which needs deep support. With the eventuality of WMD 
terrorism considered as a major threat by both the US and the EU
148, the existing framework does 
not fit anymore insofar as it does not take into account non-state threats. And the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted by the UN General 
                                                 
146 Jean-François Bayart suggests such a view in his article «  Et si l’Europe faisait fausse route dans la crise 
iranienne? », Esprit, juin 2006, pp.19-36. 
147 The USA and also, to a lesser extent, the French, refused to accept the results of the 2000 Review Conference. 
Harald Müller, op. cit., pp.34-35.  
148 See the National Security to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit., p.1 and the European Strategy against 
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p.1.   
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Assembly on April 13
th, 2005, signed by the EU25+5 has no explicit link with it.
149 Neither does 
one of the latest initiatives, the Global Initiative to struggle against nuclear terrorism, jointly taken 
by Presidents Bush and Putin at the G8 summit of July 2006.
150 More generally, current terrorist 
threats are often conceived as unprecedented realities, what suggests the inadequacy of current 
laws.
151  
Keeping the European preference powerful would then imply to show that the NPT can still 
be a framework for present-day action. It requires being able to reform it and to connect as many 
initiatives as possible to it. Otherwise, this failure will probably be interpreted in two ways: either 
Europe, as an integrated actor, is weak and does not manage to affirm and support its preferences, 
or European integration, as far as non-proliferation is concerned, will appear as a mirage hiding 
classical power politics.  
A further depreciated NPT would entail an important part of the European rising strategic 
identity in its fall.  
                                                 
149 http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty20.asp The convention is not in 
force yet. 
150 It counts 13 members, including France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Turkey, candidate to join the EU and the USA, 
Japan, China, Russia, Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Morocco. Their first meeting took place in Rabat during 
the first week of November 2006. 
151 See Andrea Bianchi, “Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism: Achievements and Prospects” in 
Andrea Bianchi (ed.), Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004, pp.491-
534, mainly his first part. 